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Abstract
This paper examines the extent to which a neo-functional or
intergovernmental process may be at work in the evolving European
Union (EU). Indeed, it investigates two models of governance that relate
to these theories to allow an understanding of decision-making procedures
at the EU level. An analysis of a service sector (the life insurance
industry) has been undertaken in respect of its relationships with the EU
decision-making institutions and it is considered that through self-interest,
national life insurance industries attempt to create a Single European
Market (SEM) in their own image.
Following a discussion of the theoretical implications of neo-
functionalism, intergovernmentalism, state-centric and multi-level
governance the paper undertakes a comparative analysis of the Member
States' regulatory regimes and combines this study with the results of a
survey conducted in 1994 to create a regulation matrix: this gives an
understanding of different regulatory environments in twelve Member
States. Secondly, the survey results illustrate the separate kinds of
regulatory environments that Member States wanted the single market to
be and offers an explanation of how different understandings of
legislation and regulatory structures may have been compromised.
Additionally, a second survey and a number of interviews indicate
decision-making procedures at the EU level and these are illustrated
through a decision-making model. Finally, the extent of neo-functional
and intergovernmental processes are posited in relation to the findings.
In theoretical terms the paper identifies aspects of both neo-functionalism
and intergovernmentalism. Indeed, it considers that multi-level
governance is the predominant means of decision-making at the EU level.
On a practical level, the paper indicates implications for the financial
services sector in relation to participation in the EU decision-making
process. Fundamentally, the paper identifies a process in a situation that
relates to financial services and tentatively makes generali ations in
respect of other industries within the financial services sector.
A conclusion of peace nullifies all existing reasons for
future war, even if these are not yet known to the
contracting parties (Kant, 1991; p 93).
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the extent to which a neo-functional or intergovernmental
process may be at work in the evolving European Union (EU). Indeed, it
investigates two models of governance that relate to these theories in an attempt
to understand decision-making procedures at the EU level. An analysis of a
service sector (the life insurance industry) has been undertaken in respect of its
relationships with the EU decision-making institutions. It is considered that
through self-interest, national life insurance industries attempt to create a market
in their own image.
Following a discussion of the theoretical implications of neo-functionalism,
intergovernmentalism, state-centric and multi-level governance the paper
undertakes a comparative analysis of the  Member States' legislative regimes and
combines this study with the results of a survey conducted in 1994 to create a
regulation matrix: this gives an understanding of different regulatory regimes in
twelve Member States. Secondly, the survey results illustrate the separate kinds
of regulatory environments that Member States wanted the single market to be
and offers an explanation of how different understandings of legislation and
regulatory structures may have been compromised. Additionally, a second
survey and a number of interviews illustrate decision-making procedures at the
EU level and these are illustrated through a decision-making model. Finally, the
extent of neo-functional and intergovernmental processes are posited in relation
to the findings.
NEO-FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERGOVERNMENTALISM
“Neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism were contending theories of
European integration in the 1960s but by the 1970s intergovernmentalism
appeared to have carried the day, until in the 1980s the single market
programme and the Single European Act led to a revival of neo-functionalist
explanations” (George 1994 p 1). Indeed, neo-functionalism considers that the
integration process is one where political actors are persuaded to allocate their
loyalties and political activities towards another setting. Political actors are
persuaded to do this through pressures from organised groups that express
demands for further integration. The neo-functional model does not need overall
consent it is driven by self-seeking interest groups who are restrained only by
the acceptance of the rules of the game, rules they themselves have a hand in
creating. It has been posited that integration results through the process of
institutionalised patterns of interest group politics undertaken in existing
organisations. The self seekers in this context are the individual Member State
insurance industries and companies. Haas presented the European dimension as
one where,
. . . political integration is the process whereby political actors in
several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their
loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre,
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-
existing national states. The end result of a process of political
integration is a new political community, superimposed over the
pre-existing ones (Haas, 1958; p 16).
On the other hand, intergovernmentalism is underpinned by the realist model of
international politics. This considers that international relations is based on
power politics and that nation-states are the main actors in the international
arena. Indeed, international relations in the form of foreign policy are pursued
by nation-states. Consequently, these are the motors of change. However,
. . . political realism does not assume that the contemporary
conditions under which foreign policy operates, with their extreme
instability and the ever present threat of large scale violence cannot
be changed . . . Nothing in the realist position militates against the
assumption that the present division of the political world into
nation states will be replaced by larger units of a quite different
character, more in keeping with the technical potentialities and the
moral requirements of the contemporary world (Morganthau, 1973;
pp. 9-10).
But this may only be achieved through the forces at our disposal and these forces
are provided in the form of the nation-state. The questions is; will the nation-
state ever make itself obsolete?
Subject to this critique intergovernmentalism considers a number of points:
firstly, it considers that regional integration should take global criteria into
account; secondly, it contends that the real power-houses in the process of
European integration are the nation-states and these will remain committed to
national interest; finally, intergovernmentalists think that the transference
between high and low politics would never take place; integration would be
condoned in technical fields to ensure mutual benefit but would never move into
areas like defence, monetary policy and national security.
There is no need to dispute the first of these points as everything is determined
by wider parameters and historical change in this context neo-functionalism
considers global criteria. The second of these assumptions denies the neo-
functional idea that through sector bargaining the political process would shift
from the national to the supranational and overcome the dichotomy that the
realists create for themselves; in terms of things will change but only through the
perpetuation of what already exists. Finally, the third assumption may be
disputed because of the potential advent of monetary union and the extensions
of decision-making powers that the European institutions have incrementally
accrued.
Mutimer (1989) revisits neo-functionalism and emphasises the importance of the
SEA. He also considers that federalism is inappropriate when analysing the EU.
However, he eventually dismisses neo-functionalism because ". . . even in
amended form it is not sufficient" (ibid p 101); this, one may consider, is rather
an ambitious statement given the evidence that his paper provides.  Pederson
(1992) considers that intergovernmentalism should be combined with elements
of neo-functionalism to enable a new framework of analysis. Keohane and
Hoffman (1990, 1991) emphasise a pooling of sovereignty rather than its
transference from the Member States to supranational institutions. A stronger
intergovernmental stance is taken by Moravcsik (1991, 1993) whose analysis of
the SEA considers that the primary source of integration resides with the
Member States themselves. A more neo-functional perspective is taken by
Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) who contended that three groups reshaped the
EU: industrial elites, EU institutions and Member State governments.
Furthermore, Sandholtz (1994) investigates why Member States are prepared to
give up their currencies and the sovereignty this entails. He contends that
membership of the EU defines preference parameters and decisions.
Intergovernmentalism alone fails to explain the impact that membership of the
EU has on Member State preferences, interests and demands. Indeed, if
European integration is to be fully understood a combination of approaches is
necessary.  This is a theme that has also been posited by Tranholme-Mikkelsen
(1991), George (1994, 1995), Gehring (1996) who also consider that further
empirical work is necessary to enable greater understanding. In an empirical
study of European integration over the late 1960s and early 1970s, Kirchner
(1976) argues that the ". . . logic and forces outlined by Haas were generally
found to be operative" (p 4).
Peterson (1995) considers that ". . . the gap remains wide between theoretical
models which seek to explain broad patterns of European integration and those
which seek to explain the EU's policy-making process" (p 69). However, the
debate has turned toward governance through the arguments initiated by
Keohane and Hoffman (1991), Marks (1993), Marks et al  (1996) and Marks et al
(1996a). A number of questions have been formed regarding the political order
that is emerging in the EU and based on more general theories, policy-making
has been investigated. Indeed, two theories predominate within the debate.
On the one side, functionalists and neo-functionalists have
conceived of the process of institutional innovation as one of
integration in which supranational institutions compromise state
autonomy and sovereignty by shaping institutional competencies,
resources and decision-making rules. On the other side . . .
intergovernmental theorists have argued that member states and
their executives continue to dominate decision-making in the
European Community . . . While they differ substantively, these
contending accounts share a fundamental assumption about how to
conceptualise the European Community. Both view the defining
features of the outcome in terms of the relative role of
supranational versus national institutions. They share a conception
of the outcome of institution building in the European Community
as varying along a dimension characterised by
intergovernmentalism at one extreme and a supranational state at
the other (Marks, 1993; p 391).
STATE-CENTRIC AND MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE
Hooghie and Marks (1997) link neo-functionalism (through supranational actors
and interest groups) to multilevel governance and intergovernmentalism to
state-centric governance. They conclude that the state-centric approach is not
capable of fully explaining European policy making processes; that EU decision-
making and policy-making are of a multilevel nature. Indeed, Marks et al (1996)
provide an interesting interpretation of the present situation. "Multilevel
governance does not confront the sovereignty of states directly. Instead of being
explicitly challenged states in the European Union are being melded gently into
multilevel polity by their leaders and the actions of numerous sub national and
supranational actors. State-centric theorists are right when they argue that states
are extremely powerful institutions that are capable of crushing direct threats to
their existence" (p 371). However, it is not necessary ". . . to argue that states are
on the verge of political extinction to believe that their control of those living in
their territories has significantly weakened" (ibid).
The intergovernmental approach adheres to the state-centric model. This
considers that the ". . . overall direction of policy making is consistent with state
control" (Hooghe and Marks, 1997; p 22). Furthermore, " . . . the core
presumption underlying the state-centric governance model is that European
integration does not challenge the autonomy of nation-states. "State-centrists
contend that EU membership preserves or even strengthens state sovereignty
and that European integration is driven by bargains among member-state
governments . . . In this model, supranational actors exist to aid member states to
facilitate agreements by providing information that would not otherwise be
available. Policy outcomes reflect the interests and relative power of member-
state executives, not those of the supranational actors (ibid, p 21).
If the state-centric model is the dominant means of decision-making in the EU,
three conditions would need to hold: Member State representatives in the
Council of Ministers should be able to impose their understandings and
preferences on other European institutions; Member States should always be
sovereign in relation to other Member States; Member States should be able to
control sub national interests (ibid).
The multilevel governance model is based on certain aspects of neo-
functionalism. It considers ". . . that European integration is a polity-creating
process in which authority and policy making influence is shared across
multiple levels of government sub national, national and supranational" (ibid, p
22). The model recognises the central role played by Member States in the
decision-making process and considers that elements of control have been
passed on to supranational institutions. Consequently, in certain areas Member
States have lost aspects of their sovereignty.
In Short, the multilevel governance model claims that the locus of
political control has changed. Individual state sovereignty is
diluted in the EU by collective decision-making among national
governments and by the autonomous roles of the European
parliament, the European Commission, and the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) (ibid, p 22).
If the multilevel governance model is to be accepted a number of premises must
hold. Initially the supranational institutions (European Parliament and
Commission) should share authority with the Council of Ministers. Secondly,
that the individual Member State executives should be unable to continually
stamp their authority on collective decision-making. And finally (especially in
respect of this paper) we would require that". . . that sub national interests
mobilise directly in the European arena (ibid, p 24).
MARKET ENVIRONMENT LEGISLATION
This section of the paper wishes to illustrate how the different legislative
structures of the individual Member States create differing regulatory
environments and provide an example of how turbulence may be overcome
through harmonisation. This process is evident in the life insurance sector
because of the amount of differing legislation and the consequent problems in
establishing an SEM.  To this extent, changes in legislation display changes in
individual regulatory environments which give an indication of the final
framework that will identify the SEM in the life insurance sector.
The Regulation Matrix
The matrix gives an interpretation of what a regulatory environment entails, and
identifies both similarities and differences within this context and displays how
the process of legislative change may be examined. This is pursued through
illustrating the 12 Member State life insurance industries on the matrix ( this
displays the amount of regulation through the use a scale of 1-12 ), each unit of
the matrix indicating the regulatory regime of the given Member State. The
matrix was initially compiled in 1994 hence it only deals with the membership of
the EU at that time.
The matrix is  broken down into three categories each designated by the type of
legislation which indicates a regulatory environment. These are: liberal.
prescribed, nationalised or  (state controlled). It displays the different regulation
in each individual Member State. To enable such an analysis, a study of the
different legislation in respect of life insurance has been undertaken which has
given an understanding of each Member State's regulatory environment.
Through the use of the matrix, the analysis compares the regulatory
environments of the individual Member States and illustrates the process
involved in the pursuit of  a single market in relation to the normative
perceptions of  legislation. Each Member State has a different cultural tradition
in relation to financial institutions and investment which is illustrated through
historical attitudes that are exemplified through legislation and the subsequent
regulation relating to life insurance.
A liberal market is illustrated between one and four on the scale and is specified
by the basic premise of self regulation with minimal legislation.   The analysis
considered that four life insurance industries had relatively liberal markets in
respect of their legislation: these were, Netherlands, Luxembourg, the UK and
Eire. The liberal markets are similar in respect of ideology  i.e. free market ethos
and limited legislation. However, despite these similarities each market has
distinct differences. One may consider that the differences relate to cultural
existence’s that are manifest in the economic sphere through definite legislation
and institutional norms. The differences between the Member States in this area
do however seem to be diminishing, as the European legal system becomes
further harmonised. All four Member States have had to bring themselves into
line with EU legislation which does seem to be moving toward greater rather
than less regulation.
The prescribed market environment lies between five and eight on the scale and
within this range there is tight legislation without any or limited Member State
interference in the companies themselves. Within this section, the study has
identified four Member States with lesser or greater degrees of prescription. One
may consider that Belgium is a five on the scale Spain and Denmark a six and
Germany a seven. It may be argued that through its legislative programme, the
French structure also falls into this category. However, there is still state
ownership in the French environment consequently it is treated as a partially
nationalised or state-controlled regulatory structure. Within the prescribed
regulatory environments there are differing amounts of prescription some
border on the liberal and others on the state-controlled. One may consider that
Germany is the most prescribed, whereas in Spain and Denmark, although
highly regulated, some flexibility is allowed. It may be contended that the
Belgian market indicates  the impending European regulatory environment in
respect of its existing legislation. What is apparent is the democratic nature of
Belgian supervision and how this does not negate but is  indicative of EU guide-
lines.
The study placed four Member Sates in the state-controlled regulatory
environment area. Each has a state-controlled element to its life insurance
market in that there is a preponderance of state ownership in respect of life
insurance companies. Regulation is extreme in the four state-controlled life
insurance markets which may be considered typical of a nationalised ethos.
However, each Member State within this category is providing changes to its
legislation, which will allow greater freedom and allow more competitive
regulatory structure which is more in line with the impending SEM. To compile
the matrix these propositions were amalgamated with the results of the
following  survey of Member State regulatory structure. Both sets of data are
displayed in the regulation matrix below.
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT SURVEY
To provide a more objective analysis of the data the results of a survey were
added to the comparative analysis undertaken above. The comparative analysis
indicated both the subjectivity of the author along with the objectivity of the data
itself i.e. the regulation in the individual Member States. On the other hand, the
survey illustrates the subjectivity of the questions put and the imperfect
objectivity of the respondents.
The Survey Questions
To supplement the initial categorisation of the EU regulatory environments, a
survey was conducted to investigate the perceptions of life insurance companies
throughout the EU. The main purpose of the questionnaire was to gain an
understanding of how the Member State industries viewed their own regulatory
environments and what they considered would be most advantageous for them
at the EU level. Following a detailed explanation of the meaning of the 1-12 scale
the questions below were asked:
(1)  How liberal or state-controlled is your national life insurance regulatory
structure?
(2) Where would you place the Single European Market (SEM) life insurance
sector regulatory environment?
(3) What type of regulatory environment do you consider that the SEM should
be to allow your company its greatest advantage?
(4) What type of regulatory environment do you consider the SEM in life
insurance should be to allow the greatest consumer protection?
(5) What type of regulatory environment do you consider the SEM in life
insurance should be to allow the greatest consumer choice?
300 questionnaires were sent out and 121 completed questionnaires were
returned (the survey was undertaken in 1994). These were broken down by
Member State as follows;
UK = 36
Germany = 25
Netherlands = 15
Italy = 12
France = 17
Belgium, Spain & Eire (Other) = 16
Total = 121
No responses were received from Greece, Denmark, Portugal or Luxembourg.
As with the comparative analysis, the responses were categorised into liberal,
prescribed and nationalised markets, for each of the eight responding Member
States. The results are summarised in Table 1.
INSERT TABLE 1.
The responses summarised in Table 1 were then used to add to the initial
comparative analysis and compile the matrix illustrated by Fig 1. The means of
the responses shown in Table 1 were averaged with the analysis of the
legislation. This gave equal weight to both the comparative analysis of the
regulatory environments and the perceptions of the insurance industry. Indeed,
the survey results were similar to the categorisation of the markets illustrating a
degree of agreement between the two sources of data.
INSERT FIGURE 1.
The second question asked the companies where they would position the SEM at
that moment in time in respect of regulation. Once again this was on a scale of 1-
12 and categorised the regulatory types as liberal, prescribed and nationalised;
the responses are summarised in Table 6.2. In general, there was agreement that
the SEM as it stood was located between 5.0 and 7.0 with the mean of the
responses of all Member States equal to 6.0.
INSERT TABLES 2 & 3.
The third question asked the respondents to indicate which type of regulatory
environment would give their company its greatest advantage. The results are
summarised in Table 3.
Generally, the Member States pursue market environments that are less
regulated or similar to their own. There is no push for greater regulation.
However, there are differences between the amount of liberality that should be
allowed. This suggests that a compromise needs to be reached between the
prescribed and liberal markets which is indicated in Fig 1 and Table 3.
Question four asked what type of regulatory environment would allow the
greatest consumer protection and question five which would allow the greatest
consumer choice. Each of these allowed an understanding of what the
respondents considered a regulatory environment to entail and gave an insight
into their initial perceptions in respect of the first three questions. Responses are
summarised in Tables 4 and 5.
INSERT TABLES 4 & 5.
These responses suggest that the respondents were aware of what was meant by
a regulatory environment and fully understood the questions that they were
being asked. Indeed, there was a form of hegemony when it came to
understanding the survey and the concept of a regulatory environment.
However, this is more explicit in terms of the understanding of  consumer
choice. It was around the issues of choice and protection that the debate with
regard to market legislation difficulties revolved. The extent that Member States
considered that consumer protection was more or less important than consumer
choice and the amount of legislation that should be used in enabling consumer
protection at the cost of consumer choice. At some point these differing ideas of
best market environment needed to be compromised; the problem was where
and how?
Convergence Procedures
The state-controlled and greater prescribed regulatory environments indicate the
convergence process with the greatest clarity as these markets are either
choosing or being forced to bring their legislation into line with the less
regulated markets.  However, the more liberal structures also need to change
their legislation to bring them into line with European directives. The less
prescribed and less liberal markets (those between 4 and 5) have the fewest
changes to make and this is apparent in their adroitness at bringing in the
directives. This is particularly so of Belgium and to a lesser extent Eire, Spain,
Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands.  The matrix attempts to identify the
compromise point between the Member States. It also allows for a more
illuminating comparison between the Member State legislative regimes in
relation to a specific regulatory environment.  Member State industries start
negotiations looking for legislation as near to, but usually more liberal than,
their own i.e. the UK pursuing point 3 and Germany and Italy point 5 and
France point 6 (see table 3). Consequently, on this evidence it may be posited
that a more liberal market than was generally held in Europe would be the most
amenable type. Ultimately, it is suggested that the legislation finally formulated
should be between points 4 and 5 and then mutual recognition will come into
play. However, the next question is how does this compromise take place?
The matrix illustrated such questions as how agreement may be reached in the
face of differing views on market environments between Member State life
insurance sectors, the European life insurance sector and the EU decision making
institutions and the EU institutions and Member State governments? It is in
answering these questions that one begins to understand the importance of
interest groups at the European and national levels in the creation of European
legislation. If the EU institutions are not to determine the process completely and
have an understanding of what the sector wants, the national industries need to
compromise their views and these can only be genuinely unified at the EU level;
the easiest way to do this is through an EU interest group. Indeed, if the sector is
to emphasise what it wants, it must interact with the EU decision-making
institutions (the supranational entity). Finally, if the legislation is to be accepted
by the Council it must have the acceptance of a majority of Member States. These
are informed of the EU's position by the national interest groups. In this context
we see a mixture of neo-functional and intergovernmental processes. However,
the activities of interest groups and the supranational entity do seem to be a
central aspect of the process.
Interest Group Usage in the UK (A Further Survey)
To substantiate interest group use, a further survey asked the UK insurance
industry the extent to which it used interest groups at the national and European
level. For this survey 70 questionnaires were sent out and 36 were returned.
When asked if they used a European interest group in their participation of the
formulation of the Third Life Insurance Directive 81.4% said no. Yet, 81.5%
considered that they used a national interest group in most cases, the ABI and
BIIC. The BIIC negotiates on behalf of the ABI at the EU level and represents the
views of the ABI's membership.  The link between the European and national
interest groups was further substantiated by questions three and four 85.2% did
not directly use European interest groups at all 74.0% contending that they
didn't even subscribe to one, whereas, 100.0% of respondents subscribed to a
national interest group. Even when their European interests were threatened
77.7% of companies did not directly approach European institutions whereas
51.8% would approach their national government. However, 59.2% would
usually use interest groups to lobby on their behalf at the European level and
89.9% at the national level. When asked if they prefer to use interest groups at
the European level to enable European-wide sector compromises 81.5% of
respondents rejected this idea. However, 85.2% used interest groups at the
national level because this enabled nation-wide compromise.  In general,
national interest groups are members of European interest groups which pursue
national sector/industry compromises at the EU level, it is through this process
that European-wide compromises are reached and the importance of European
interest groups emphasised.
Those respondents that indicated which interest groups they were members of,
28 were members of the ABI and 2 of the BIIC; these two considered that
through their membership of the BIIC they were affiliated to the CEA. However,
all 30 were affiliated to the CEA (the other 28 through their membership of the
ABI). However, none of the respondents considered that they were direct
members of any European interest group. One respondent did point out that
his/her company was a member of other national interest groups in other
Member States and would seek to influence their views on important matters .
THE INTERVIEW PROGRAMME
Additionally, an interview programme of EU and Member State officials was
undertaken with regard to the third life directive.  The key individuals that were
interviewed were representatives from the following institutions.
Directorate-Generale XV. (DG XV) (Finance).
The Council Permanent Representative for the UK, France and Eire (Finance).
The Department of Industry & Trade (DTI).
Committee for European Assurance (CEA).
Bureau International des Producteurs d'Assurance & de Reassurance  (BIPAR).
Association of British Insurers (ABI). Under the title British Insurers
International Committee (BIIC).
Each interviewee was  an individual who dealt explicitly with the Third Life
Insurance Directive and each illustrated interaction with the other.
The interviews indicated agreement on a number of points: the Third Life
Insurance Directive was unanimously perceived as a means of providing the
environment that would allow mutual recognition to be achieved; it was also
acknowledged that many influences went into the drafting of a directive. Since
1988 interaction between industries and the Commission has become more
apparent at the EU level. The representative of DG XV considered that a fluent
contact with the life industry was imperative in respect of legislative input. Most
importantly, the interviews illustrate the interactory procedures at work within
the creation of the third life directive and the extent of the use of interest groups
in the process. However what is also clear is the intergovernmental aspects. The
following understanding of the process and  decision-making flow model (see
fig 2) were provided by the above interviewees.
For the purpose of this study the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is not
discussed. Indeed, there are a number of issues to be explained with regard to
the model. Firstly, the survey regarding Member State interest group
membership and the interviews illustrated that the majority of insurance
companies were members of national interest groups. Further interviews
indicated that national interest groups were affiliated to interest groups at the
EU level (for insurance mainly the CEA and BIPAR). Secondly, in the
formulation of legislation (although Member State interest groups may approach
the European institutions), the Commission and European Parliament preferred
to deal with European wide interest groups because these allow a European
picture of the situation. Thirdly, because the industry/sector allows further
understanding what is necessary for the successful operation of the embryonic
European regulatory environment it is highly likely that they will confer and
reach some agreement prior to national involvement. Finally, the interviews
with the CEA, the ABI, members of the BIIC and members of EU decision-
making institutions substantiated that other Member State insurance industries
actively participated in the creation of EU legislation through interest groups.
INSERT FIGURE 2.
There are two general decision-making procedures that can be identified on the
model shown in fig 2. These are indicated by arrows A and B; route A considers
that demands are formulated through the national legislature prior to
formulation at the EU level; whereas route B illustrates demand formulation
being compromised at the EU level prior to the involvement of the national
legislature. Route A is a stronger intergovernmental approach whereas route B
illustrates more of a neo-functional process. Of course the situation is not as
clear-cut as depicted and elements of both routes were in use but in general the
interviews emphasised route B.
However, the European interest group rarely had any dealings with the national
legislature and interaction between the two was undertaken between the
national interest group and the national governmental departments, (the DTI in
the UK). Consequently, at this point there is intergovernmental involvement
even though it is minimal and in most cases the DTI adheres to decisions already
made at the EU interest group level. More importantly there is
intergovernmental involvement in the Council. However, since the SEA and
QMV, this has been minimised because if a directive is to be successful it needs
only the support of a majority of Member States, not unanimity.
The interviews illustrate that agreement is sought and usually accomplished at
the European interest group level in tandem with the Commission and
Parliament. Indeed, if the legislation is being negotiated between the sector
through interest group involvement with a supranational institution (EU
decision-making institutions) the research has uncovered elements of neo-
functionalism. If a compromise is not reached at the EU level, then each Member
State industry would pursue its own ideal regulatory environment (as indicated
by the matrix) and compromise would be difficult if not impossible to achieve.
To enable successful acceptable legislation at the EU level the interviews and
surveys illustrate that both neo-functional and intergovernmental processes need
to be at work.
THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
As the free movement of services is being attempted and monetary union is no
longer perceived as unattainable, more and more difficulties become apparent.
Consequently, it becomes ever more necessary for Member States to make
mutual concessions; compromise becomes the central factor and any national
assertion in the face of the need for pragmatism slows up or destroys the
process. However, as the process becomes more intense, agreements are harder
to win, as Lindberg indicated,
. . . there is no paradox between the progress of economic
integration in the Community and sharpening political
disagreement; indeed, the success of economic integration
can be a cause of political disagreement. The Member States
are engaged in the enterprise for widely different reasons,
and their actions have been supported or instigated by elites
seeking their own particular goals. Therefore, conflicts
would seem endemic as the results of joint activity come to
be felt and as the pro-integration consensus shifts [Lindberg,
1963; p 80].
These conflicts may be illustrated through the intergovernmental role in the
integration process. As international difficulties with regard to European
competitiveness became paramount pressure was put on governments by sectors
to enable a true common market in Europe. This engendered the necessity to
agree the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty at the Member State level but also
indicated the part played by sectors while pursuing self-interest.
The SEA, the SEM and the Maastricht Treaty create clarity of objectives and what
is necessary if these objectives are to be realised. It also becomes necessary for
each area to be looked at in the context of its own specifics and this necessitates
the involvement of interest groups and sectors. The sword is double edged, what
needs to be changed becomes clearer but winning these changes becomes harder.
This is the situation the EU is in at the moment in respect of the free movement
of services, capital and EMU. This paper considers that Member State sectors are
forced to participate in the harmonisation process to ensure that evolving
regulations are not completely alien to those with which they already work. This
fait-accompli indicates supranationalism and spillover. It is not the EU nor the
Member States alone creating and forcing the pace of integration but also the
separate sectors of different industries in the different  Member States which
because of their membership of the EU are forced to deepen and widen
integration. This process is at least considered partly neo-functional and partly
intergovernmental but the shift is toward the neo-functional aspects with regard
to interest group use, supranationalism and spillover: and through these
processes greater clarity is created.
The knowledge of national regulatory structures and what is necessary for
harmonisation negates turbulence. Indeed, working parameters are drawn up by
the actors involved and through the  neo-functional processes of spillover and
supranationality compromise is reached and integration intensified. However
within the process there is an intergovernmental element i.e. The Council of
Ministers and the sectors interaction with national governments but as
integration intensifies this aspect of the process diminishes and Morganthau’s
understanding that political change will be linked to its historical circumstances
is verified (Morganthau, 1973). Effectively, the process of harmonisation is
neither purely intergovernmental nor neo-functional but as the paper has sought
to illustrate an amalgamation of both and in this context it carries elements of
realism and functionalism.
Agreement is sought and usually reached at the European interest group level
through interaction with the Commission and Parliament. Indeed, if the
legislation is being negotiated by the industry through interest group
involvement with a supranational institution (EU decision-makers), the research
has uncovered elements of neo-functionalism. If a compromise is not reached at
the EU level, then each Member State industry would pursue its own ideal
legislation (see Tables) and compromise would be difficult if not impossible to
achieve. The proposed legislation that goes to the Council has generally been
agreed by the Member State sectors/industries who either progressively or
subsequently inform their own government of the situation in relation to the
agreed position. During the process there may be disagreements between the
Council and the other institutions. However, to enable successful acceptable
legislation, the interviews and surveys, illustrate that at the EU level both neo-
functional and intergovernmental processes need to be at work.
This paper illustrates a supranational body which, through the use of interest
groups, national organisations have partially shifted their allegiances. However,
intergovernmental processes are at work in terms of the creation of the Treaties
that allow a neo-functional process to take place and the Council still plays a
major role in the EU decision-making process. Ultimately, European interest
groups and supranationality are employed in the creation of EU legislation
(aspects of neo-functionalism): subsequently elements of both
intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism are apparent in the European
integration process.
The interviews indicated that in some cases state executives are unable to hold
onto sovereignty. Indeed, collectively they are unable to define the agenda ". . .
because they are unable to control the supranational institutions they have
created at the European level" (Marks and Hooghe, 1997; p 38). Sectors (sub
national actors) circumvent the national legislature and directly lobby the EU
institutions. It is apparent that decision-making at the European level ". . . is
characterised by mutual dependence, complimentary functions, and overlapping
competencies" (ibid). In this context, there is an interaction between
intergovernmental and neo-functional processes at the EU level. During the
1960s and the 1970s an intergovernmental system was in ascendance and this
provided the environment for the state-centric model. However, with the advent
of the SEA in the 1980s and the added authority of the EU institutions ". . . a
system of multilevel governance arose, in which the activities of supranational
and subnational actors diluted national government control" (ibid, p 39). The
interviews illustrated that the Member States were ". . . no longer . . . the
exclusive nexus between domestic politics and international relations" (ibid).
Indeed, sub national actors were making ". . . direct connections . . . in diverse
political arenas. Traditional and formerly exclusive channels of communication
and influence are being side-stepped" (ibid). Multilevel governance allows
interest groups to be involved at both EU and national levels. However, as the
interviews and subsequent Decision-Making Model illustrated, when we speak
of European legislation, the shift is toward the supranational. Multilevel
governance does not confront the sovereignty of states directly. Instead of being
explicitly challenged, states in the European Union are being melded gently into
a multilevel polity by their leaders and by the actions of numerous sub national
and supranational actors. State-centric theorists are right when they argue that
states are extremely powerful institutions that are capable of crushing direct
threats to their existence. The organi(s)ational form of the state emerged because
it proved an effective means of systematically wielding violence . . . One does
not have to argue that states are on the verge of political extinction to believe that
their control of those living in their territories has been significantly weakened
(Hooghe and Marks, 1997; p 38 author’s bracket).
CONCLUSION
In theoretical terms the paper illustrates aspects of both neo-functionalism and
intergovernmentalism. Indeed, it identifies multi-level governance as the
predominant means of decision-making at the EU level. On a practical level, the
paper indicates implications for the financial services sector in relation to
participation in the EU decision-making process. Fundamentally, the paper
identifies a process in a situation that relates to life insurance and tentatively
makes generalisations in respect of other industries within the financial services
sector and the professions. Given the predominance of multi-level governance
the empirical data implies that if an industry or profession is to have an impact
on the formulation of EU legislation it must be involved in the process as early
and for as long as possible.
APPENDIX
A Survey of the UK Insurance Industry regarding Interest Group Use.
(1) Your company used organised interest groups at the European level i.e. the
CEA in the formulation of the third life directive.
(2) Your company used organised interest groups at the national level i.e. the
ABI in the formulation of the third life directive.
(3) Your company uses organised interest groups at the European level for most
European issues.
(4) Your company subscribes to a European interest group.
(5) Your company subscribes to a national interest group.
(6) Your company lobbies European institutions when its European interests are
affected.
(7) Your company lobbies the national government when European interests are
affected.
(8) Your company primarily uses interest groups to lobby on its behalf at the
European level.
(9) Your company primarily uses interest groups to lobby on its behalf at the
national level.
(10) Your company prefers to use interest groups at the European level because
this allows European sector wide compromises.
(11) Your company prefers to use interest groups at the national level because
this allows nation-wide sector compromises.
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